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Abstract
The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements as a network forma-
tion game. We consider a three-country model in which international trade occurs
between economies with imperfectly competitive product markets. Labor markets
can be unionized and non-unionized in each country. We show that if all countries are
of the same type (all of them are either unionized or non-unionized), the global free
trade network is both the unique pairwise stable network and the unique efficient net-
work. If some countries are unionized while others are non-unionized, other networks
apart from the global free trade network are likely to be pairwise stable. However,
the efficient network is always the global free trade network. Thus, a conflict between
stability and efficiency may occur. Moreover, starting from the network in which no
country has signed a free trade agreement, all sequences of networks due to continu-
ously profitable deviations do not lead (in most cases) to the global free trade network,
even when global free trade is stable.
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1 Introduction
The pursuit of bilateral and regional trade agreements in the last decades, has raised the
question of whether bilateral trade agreements or multilateral trade negotiations under
the auspices of GATT is the most conductive to a movement towards global free trade
and a maximization of world welfare. Governments have asserted that bilateral free trade
negotiations are compatible with the goal of multilateral trade liberalization, but others
(Bhagwati (1993) and Levy (1997)) have questioned whether bilateral arrangements will
lead to broader liberalization. Considerable attention has been given to the welfare effects
of regional free trade associations and customs unions (see for example Krugman (1991)).
A second set of issues concern the incentives of countries to form regional free trade
associations and customs unions, and the strategic stability of particular trading regimes.
Krishna (1998) has adopted a political economy approach to show that trade-diverting
preferential arrangements are more likely to be supported politically and that such pref-
erential arrangements could critically change domestic incentives so multilateral liberal-
ization that is initially politically feasible could be rendered infeasible by a preferential
arrangement.
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Contrary to Krishna (1998), Ornelas (2005a) has used an oligopolistic-
political-economy model where the external tariffs of the members of a free trade agree-
ment, as well as the decision to form free trade agreements, are endogenously determined.
He has shown that free trade agreements tend to enhance support for further liberalization
at the multilateral level by reducing the role of special interests criteria in governments’
trade regime decisions. Adopting a slightly different approach, Yi (1996) has endogenized
the formation of the customs union structure, which is a partition of the set of countries.
He has shown that the rules of customs union formation are crucial: if open membership
is allowed, then the grand coalition (global free trade) is the only stable customs union.
However, the grand coalition is not stable under the rule that a union is formed if and only
if all potential members agree to its formation. But the restriction to partitions is a strong
one indeed if our interest is in bilateral trade agreements, since it rules out situations in
which, for example, countries 1 and 2 have a bilateral trade agreement and countries 2
and 3 have a similar agreement but there is no agreement between 1 and 3.
2
When this
occurs, it is not appropriate to view countries 1, 2 and 3 as one coalition, and we cannot
think of 1 and 2 and 2 and 3 being two distinct coalitions, since this violates the mutual
exclusiveness property of coalitions. The theory of networks provides a natural way to
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Levy (1997), using a median-voter model in a differentiated products-monopolistic competition setting
has arrived at similar conclusions: bilateral arrangements can undermine political support for multilateral
trade liberalization.
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For instance, Israel has bilateral free trade agreements with the United States and the European
Community, respectively, but the latter two do not have such an agreement between them.
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think of such issues, since it allows for such intransitive relationships, and it allows the
study of the nature of trading regimes that are consistent with the incentives of individual
countries.
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Goyal and Joshi (2005) have been the first investigating the formation of free trade
agreements as a network formation game. By assuming that countries are symmetric with
respect to the market size and the number of domestic firms they obtain that the process
of bilateral trade agreements can generate either a free trade regime or an almost free
trade regime. Furusawa and Konishi (2002) have analyzed the trading network generated
by countries that trade a numeraire good and a continuum of differentiated industrial
commodities. They have shown that, when all countries are symmetric, the global free
trade network in which every pair of countries sign a free trade agreement is stable, and
it is the unique stable network if industrial commodities are not highly substitutable.
However, if countries are asymmetric in the market size and/or in the size of industrial
good sector, the global free trade network may not be attained.
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The purpose of the
present paper is to provide another kind of asymmetry that could impede the formation
of a free trade network among countries: the fact that some countries are unionized while
others are non-unionized.
The labor market implications of European integration are of considerable importance.
Since labor is not very mobile in Europe, the effects of international integration on labor
markets are mostly indirect via product market integration. In the literature, product
market integration has been interpreted as a reduction in costs associated with interna-
tional trade: transport costs, tariffs, taxes, information costs about foreign markets, etc.
These costs could be divided into fixed costs or start up costs associated with exporting,
and variable costs proportional to the level of exports. Huizinga (1993) has shown that
a decrease in fixed costs, that implies the move from autarky to fully integrated mar-
kets, would increase the degree of competition in the product market and would reduce
wages. However, Naylor (1998) has shown that a decrease in variable export costs may
give rise to a higher wage since a monopoly union responds by increasing the wage rate to
the increased employment’s demand. But these works proceed by considering symmetric
countries.
In this paper we address the following questions:
3
Strategic models of network formation have been first developed by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and
Bala and Goyal (2000). Jackson (2003, 2005) provides surveys of models of network formation.
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Furusawa and Konishi (2005) have extended their previous analysis by introducing the possibility of
transfers between the signatories of free trade agreements. In that case, they have shown that, even if the
world consists of fairly asymmetric countries, the global free trade network is stable, and it is the unique
stable network unless industrial commodities are highly substitutable.
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(i) What is the relationship between the degree of product market integration and the
wage level in presence of asymmetries among countries?
(ii) What are the incentives of unionized and non-unionized countries to form free trade
agreements and what is the architecture of stable networks of free trade agreements?
(iii) Are individual incentives to form free trade agreements adequate from a social welfare
point of view?
To answer these questions we use a model of imperfect competition that could be
regarded as a simplified version of the oligopolistic intra-industry trade model of Kr-
ishna (1998), in the sense that we assume one firm in each country and identical demand
functions.
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But we enrich Krishna’s model by incorporating the existence of countries of
different types (unionized or non-unionized) and by endogenizing the formation of any
trading regime. We develop a three-stage game. In stage one, each government decides
the bilateral free trade agreements (links) he likes to sign in order to maximize welfare.
The collection of pairwise links between countries defines a trading regime (network). In
the second stage, given a configuration of free trade agreements, wages are set inside each
country either by the union (if the firm is unionized) or by the firm (if the firm is non-
unionized). Finally, in the third stage, firms compete in the different markets by choosing
quantities. Each firm regards each country as a separate market and chooses the profit-
maximizing quantity for each market separately, and on the Cournot assumption that the
other firms’ outputs in each market are given. We are interested in the network of free
trade agreements that emerges in this setting.
A simple way to analyze the networks that one might expect to emerge in the long
run is to examine a sort of equilibrium requirement that agents not benefit from altering
the structure of the network. A weak version of such condition is the pairwise stability
notion defined by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). A network is pairwise stable if no agent
benefits from severing one of their links and no other two agents benefit from adding a
link between them, with one benefiting strictly and the other at least weakly. In a three-
country model, there are four possible network architectures: the complete network, the
star network, the partially connected network, and the empty network. In the complete
network (global free trade) every pair of countries are linked (every pair of countries have
signed a free trade agreement). The star network is a network in which there is a “hub”
5
Many studies have given theoretical support to the empirical observation that a large share of interna-
tional trade is intra-industry, i.e., consists of two-way trade in identical, or similar, products. Monopolistic
or imperfect competition plays an important role behind the reason advocated in the explanations (see
Anderson, Donsimoni and Gabszewicz (1989) and Cordella (1993)).
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country directly linked to every other country, while none of the other countries have a
direct link with each other. The partially connected network refers to a configuration in
which two countries are linked while the third country is isolated. In the empty network
there is no link.
There are two effects when two symmetric countries sign a free trade agreement im-
plying a tariff-free access to their respective markets. First, the foreign firm can enter the
domestic market without paying tariffs. It has an ambiguous impact on the social welfare
of the home country since it increases domestic competition and thus increases consumers
surplus but lowers profits of the own firm from domestic operations as well as collected
tariffs. Second, the domestic firm gets greater access to the foreign market. It raises profits
of the domestic firm from foreign operations. However, the net impact on the social wel-
fare of the home country is positive. So, any pair of symmetric countries has an incentive
to form a bilateral free trade agreement. We find that the complete network is the unique
pairwise stable network when either all firms are unionized or all firms are non-unionized.
This last result contrasts with Goyal and Joshi (2005) where tariffs remain prohibitively
high between countries that do not have a bilateral free trade agreement.
6
Goyal and Joshi
(2005) have obtained that a stable trading network is either a complete network or consists
of two components, one component has N − 1 countries and is complete, and the other
component has a single country. In our model, the fact that tariffs are not prohibitive
between countries that have not signed a free trade agreement makes consumers, firms
and countries prefer the free trade regime.
7
We also find that the complete network is the
efficient network (i.e. the network that maximizes aggregate social welfare) in each of the
two symmetric settings. Thus, there is no conflict between stability and efficiency when
either all firms are unionized or all firms are non-unionized.
Consider now the formation of a free trade agreement between a unionized country and
a non-unionized country. Under unionization, a large share of the profits of the domestic
firm goes to the union which diminishes its competitive advantage with respect to the
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This result also contrasts with Anderson, Donsimoni and Gabszewicz (1989) and with Cordella (1993).
While Anderson, Donsimoni and Gabszewicz (1989) have shown that for any given number of firms in
each country’s industry, there is always at least one of the two countries where firms make higher profits
under autarky than under free trade, Cordella (1993) has shown that even if, at the world level, free
trade is welfare improving with respect to autarky, it can be the case that some countries are damaged by
intra-industry trade liberalization. This happens if the gains of consumers cannot outweigh the losses of
producers.
7
Krishna (1998) has shown that multilateral liberalization that is initially politically feasible could be
rendered infeasible by a preferential arrangement. In our model, the fact that countries maximize welfare
instead firms’ profits and the fact that we endogenize the formation of any trading regime makes stable
the global free trade regime.
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non-unionized foreign firm. Hence, the positive effect due to greater access to the foreign
market is relatively small compared to the large negative effect on profits of the domestic
firm in the domestic market. Thus, the overall effect of a bilateral free trade agreement
can be negative. This may prevent the unionized country from forming a bilateral free
trade agreement with a non-unionized country. We find that when only one country is
unionized, the complete network is always pairwise stable, but the partially connected
network in which the two non-unionized countries have signed a free trade agreement is
also pairwise stable, except for very small values of the cost per unit of the commodity
exported (when the initial degree of product market integration is very high). When only
one country is non-unionized, the partially connected network in which the two unionized
countries have signed a free trade agreement is pairwise stable for small values of the
cost per unit of the commodity exported, the star networks in which one of the unionized
countries is connected with the other two countries is pairwise stable for intermediates
values of the cost per unit of the commodity exported, and the complete network is only
pairwise stable for relatively high values of the cost per unit of the commodity exported.
However, the complete network is the efficient network in each of these two asymmetric
settings. Thus, a conflict between stability and efficiency may occur. Moreover, starting
from the network in which no country has signed a free trade agreement, all sequences
of networks due to continuously profitable deviations do not lead (in most cases) to the
global free trade network, even when global free trade is stable.
Regarding the relationship between the degree of product market integration (mea-
sured as the level of variable export costs) and the wage level we find that, in presence of
asymmetries among firms, it is no longer true that an increase in product market integra-
tion due to a decrease in variable export costs will increase wages as was shown in Naylor
(1998). Depending on the strategic position of the own country into the network of free
trade agreements, the increase in market integration would increase or reduce the demand
for labor. Consequently, the monopoly union will respond by increasing or reducing the
wage rate to the increased or reduced demand for labor.
There are other papers that have studied the strategic stability of particular trading
regimes. Kennan and Riezman (1990) have constructed a model of customs unions in which
countries set optimal tariffs and they showed that if the customs union is big enough it can
improve its members’ welfare over free trade. Bond and Syropoulos (1996) have proved
the instability of a symmetric customs union structure in a pure exchange model of trade
among welfare-maximizing countries with CES preferences. But all these contributions take
the structure of trading blocks as exogenously given. Finally, other works have focused on
5
the welfare effects of preferential free trade associations and customs unions.
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The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. In Section 3
we analyze the stability of networks of free trade agreements. In Section 4 we study the
efficient networks and we show the conflict between stability and efficiency that arises in
the two asymmetric settings. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The model
We develop a three-stage game in a setting with three countries, each of which has one
firm producing some homogeneous good that can sell in the domestic market as well
as in each of the foreign markets. A firm’s ability to sell in foreign markets, however,
depends on the level of import tariffs set by the foreign countries. In the first stage,
countries decide the free trade agreements (or links) they are going to establish in order to
maximize their respective social welfare level. The collection of pairwise links between the
countries defines a network of free trade agreements. If two countries have negotiated a
free trade agreement, then each offers the other a tariff-free access to its domestic market;
otherwise, each imposes a non-zero tariff T on the imports from the other. Uniform non-
discriminatory tariffs are initially assumed to be applied by all countries on imports from
other countries. Firms can be unionized or non-unionized. In the second stage, wages are
settled at the firm level by the union or by the firm. Within each country the union or
the firm chooses the wage taking as given the wage set in the other countries and taking
into account the network of free trade agreements formed at the country level. In the
third stage, each firm chooses its output (and hence employment) levels for the separate
product markets, taking as given the output decisions of the other firms, the settled wages
and the network structure of free trade agreements. We are interested in the network of
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For instance, Krugman (1991) has demonstrated, in a model with differentiated products, that world
welfare is minimized when there are three equal size customs unions. Ethier (1998) has shown that a
preferential trade agreement (PTA) between two countries reduces the competitiveness of outside firms in
the markets of these two countries, leading to “ concession diversion”. This effect will undermine bilateral
trade agreements and they will be unable to support liberal trading regimes. Bagwell and Staiger (1999)
have argued that a free trade agreement (FTA) will impede the implementation of an efficient multilateral
trade agreement (though a customs union under certain conditions may not). Deardorff and Stern (1997)
have argued that a multiplicity of countries may find it harder to reach consensus on trade issues. They
have pointed out that the result of Krugman (1991) is biased against PTAs because the assumption of
differentiated products implies that each country will be importing goods from every other country and this
creates a strong possibility of trade diversion with consequent reduction in world welfare. Instead, in their
model, the incentive to negotiate PTAs is based on comparative advantage. Grafe and Mauleon (2000)
have studied the consequences of a private externality on free trade agreements in a general equilibrium
framework.
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free trade agreements that emerges in this setting.
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In a network, countries are the nodes and each link indicates a free trade agreement
between the two linked countries. Thus, a network g is simply a list of which pair of
countries are linked to each other. If we are considering a pair of countries i and j, then
{i, j} ∈ g indicates that i and j are linked under the network g and that a free trade
agreement between countries i and j has been negotiated. For simplicity, write ij to
represent the link {i, j}, so ij ∈ g indicates that i and j are linked under the network g.
The network obtained by adding link ij to an existing network g is denoted g + ij and
the network obtained by deleting link ij from an existing network g is denoted g− ij. For
any network g, let N(g) = {i ∈ N | ∃ j such that ij ∈ g} be the set of countries which
have at least one link (bilateral free trade agreement) in the network g. Let G be the
set of all possible networks. In this three-country market, there are four possible network
architectures (see Figure 1): (i) the complete network, g
c
, in which every pair of countries
is linked, (ii) the star network, g
s
, in which there is one country that is linked to the other
two countries, (iii) the partially connected network, g
p
, in which two countries have a link
and the third country is isolated, and (iv) the empty network, g
e
, in which no country
has signed a free trade agreement and therefore there is no link. In the star network, the
country which is linked to the other two countries is called the "hub" country, while the
other two countries are called the "spoke" countries. Given the importance of the network
position of a country, we will denote g
s
(i) the star network with country i occupying the
hub position, and g
p
(ij) the partial network in which countries i and j are linked.
We denote by N = {1, 2, 3} the set of countries which are connected in a network of
free trade agreements. We assume that product demand is linear:
P
i
= a− b(X
ii
+X
ji
+X
ki
), for i, j, k = 1, 2, 3, i = j, i = k, j = k,
where P
i
is the price of the homogeneous good in country i, X
ii
is production by firm i for
consumption in country i, X
ji
is production by firm j for consumption in country i, X
ki
is production by firm k for consumption in country i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Production technology
exhibits constant returns to scale with labor as the sole input and is normalized in such a
way that (X
ii
+X
ij
+X
ik
) = L
i
, where L
i
is labor input of firm i, i, j, k = 1, 2, 3, i = j,
i = k, j = k. The total labor cost to firm i of producing quantity (X
ii
+X
ij
+X
ik
) is
(X
ii
+X
ij
+X
ik
) ·W
i
, where W
i
is the wage in firm i. Let I
ij
be such that I
ij
= 1 if
countries i and j have not negotiated a free trade agreement, and I
ij
= 0 if countries i
and j have negotiated a free trade agreement. Then, for any network g, firm i’s profits
9
This oligopolistic perspective has been recently adopted by Krishna (1998) and Ornelas (2005a), and
is also consistent with recent empirical evidence that shows that trading blocs that are small in world
markets can affect outsiders significantly (see Chang and Winters (2002)).
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Figure 1: Four possible network architectures.
can be written as
Π
i
(g) = (P
i
−W
i
)X
ii
+
∑
j =i
(P
j
−W
i
− I
ij
T )X
ij
,
where T is the constant unit trade cost. We restrict parameter T to be 0 ≤ T ≤
a
4
. By
doing so, we concentrate on the more interesting cases in which there is positive trade
between two countries that have not negotiated a free trade agreement in at least one of
the network architectures. In case the firm is unionized, a risk-neutral union chooses the
wage that maximizes the economic rent,
U
i
(g) = L
i
· (W
i
−W ),
where W is the reservation wage.
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Without loss of generality, we assume W = 0. In
case the firm is non-unionized, the firm chooses the wage that maximizes profits, i.e.,
W
i
=W = 0. For any network g, the social welfare of country i is given by
SW
i
(g) = CS
i
(g) + Π
i
(g) +CT
i
(g) + U
i
(g)
where CS
i
(g) =
b
2
(X
i
)
2
with X
i
= X
1i
+X
2i
+X
3i
, is the consumer surplus of country
i, Π
i
(g) is the profit of firm i located in country i, CT
i
(g) =
∑
j =i
I
ij
T ·X
ij
is the tariff
10
By tractability, we do not consider a version of the right-to-manage model where unions and firms
have bargaining power over wages. However, Jones (1989) and Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2005) have
shown that, if the union bargaining power is not too big, it is optimal for unions that maximize the rents
to send to the negotiation table delegates who maximize the wage, and such negotiations may mimic the
monopoly-union outcomes where the unions choose their most preferred wages.
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revenue of country i, and U
i
(g) are the rents of union i. Let SW (g) denote aggregate
welfare in network g. Then, aggregate social welfare is given by
SW (g) =
∑
i∈N
SW
i
(g).
We have four different situations to be analyzed: (i) all countries are non-unionized;
(ii) only one country is unionized and the other two are non-unionized; (iii) two countries
are unionized and only one is non-unionized; (iv) all countries are unionized. Before
looking for the stability and efficiency of networks of free trade agreements, we derive for
each network architecture, the equilibrium wages, quantities produced, profits and social
welfare levels. See the appendix for details.
Regarding the relationship between the degree of product market integration (mea-
sured as the level of variable export costs) and the wage level we find that, in presence
of asymmetries among firms, it is no longer true that an increase in product market in-
tegration due to a decrease in variable export costs will increase wages as was shown in
Naylor (1998). Depending on the strategic position of the own country into the network
of free trade agreements, the increase in market integration would increase or reduce the
demand for labor. Consequently, the monopoly union will respond by increasing or re-
ducing the wage rate to the increased or reduced demand for labor. The impact of an
increase in market integration on wages in unionized countries is summarized in Table 1
where the symbol "+" means that the impact is positive and that wages increases as a
result of higher degrees of market integration, and the symbol "−" means that the impact
is negative and that wages decreases as a result of higher degrees of market integration.
empty network partial network star network
linked isolated spoke hub
all countries unionized + + + + −
only one country non-unionized + + + ± −
only one country unionized + nil ± ± −
Table 1: The impact of an increase in market integration on wages in unionized countries
In particular, in case all countries are unionized, an increase in product market inte-
gration will increase wages in the empty and partially connected networks. In the star
network, an increase in product market integration will increase wages of the firms in the
spoke countries and will reduce the wage of the firm in the hub country.
11
In case only one
country is non-unionized (the other two countries are unionized), an increase in product
11
Of course, the wage levels do not depend on the degree of product market integration in the complete
network (global free trade).
9
market integration increases wages in the empty and partially connected networks. In the
star network, an increase in product market integration reduces the wage of the unionized
firm in the hub country and has an ambiguous impact on the wage of the unionized firm
in the spoke country. In case only one country is unionized (the other two countries are
non-unionized), an increase in product market integration increases wages in the empty
network. In the partially connected network, an increase in product market integration
does not modify the wage of the unionized firm in the linked country and has an ambigu-
ous impact on the wage of the unionized firm in the isolated country. In the star network,
an increase in product market integration decreases the wage of the unionized firm in the
hub country and has an ambiguous impact on the wage of the unionized firm in the spoke
country. Thus, we observe that there is no monotonic relationship between the degree of
product market integration and the wage rate. While in the empty network greater market
integration increases wages, in the partially connected and star networks greater market
integration has an ambiguous impact on wages that depend on the strategic position of
the own country into the network of free trade agreements and on the degree of product
market integration.
3 Stability of free trade networks
A simple way to analyze the networks that one might expect to emerge in the long run
is to examine a sort of equilibrium requirement that agents not benefit from altering the
structure of the network. A weak version of such condition is the pairwise stability notion
defined by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). A network is pairwise stable if no agent benefits
from severing one of their links and no other two agents benefit from adding a link between
them, with one benefiting strictly and the other at least weakly.
Definition 1 A network g is pairwise stable if
(i) for all ij ∈ g, SW
i
(g) ≥ SW
i
(g − ij) and SW
j
(g) ≥ SW
j
(g − ij), and
(ii) for all ij /∈ g, if SW
i
(g) < SW
i
(g + ij) then SW
j
(g) > SW
j
(g + ij).
Let us say that g
′
is adjacent to g if g
′
= g + ij or g
′
= g − ij for some ij. A
network g
′
defeats g if either g
′
= g − ij and SW
i
(g
′
) ≥ SW
i
(g), or if g
′
= g + ij with
SW
i
(g
′
) ≥ SW
i
(g) and SW
j
(g
′
) ≥ SW
j
(g) with at least one inequality holding strictly.
Pairwise stability is equivalent to saying that a network is pairwise stable if it is not
defeated by another (necessarily adjacent) network. This definition of stability is quite
10
weak and should be seen as a necessary condition for strategic stability.
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We first consider countries’ incentives to form bilateral free trade agreements. Lemma
1 tells us that any pair of symmetric countries (with respect to the network position and
the unionization) has always incentives to negotiate a free trade agreement.
Lemma 1 Any pair of symmetric countries has always incentives to form a bilateral free
trade agreement.
The proof of Lemma 1, as well as all other proofs, can be found in the appendix.
There are two effects when two symmetric countries sign a free trade agreement implying
a tariff-free access to their respective markets. First, the foreign firm can enter the domestic
market without paying tariffs. It has an ambiguous impact on the social welfare of the
home country since it increases domestic competition and thus increases consumers surplus
but lowers profits of the own firm from domestic operations as well as collected tariffs.
Second, the domestic firm gets greater access to the foreign market. It raises profits of the
domestic firm from foreign operations. However, the net impact on the social welfare of
the home country is positive. So, any pair of symmetric countries has an incentive to form
a bilateral free trade agreement.
Lemma 2 tells us that any pair of asymmetric countries, one unionized and one non-
unionized but having a similar position in the network, has not always incentives to nego-
tiate a free trade agreement. Moreover, these incentives are smaller the bigger the number
of unionized countries.
Lemma 2 (i) In the asymmetric setting with only one country unionized, the spoke union-
ized and non-unionized countries in the star network always want to form a bilateral free
trade agreement, while the unionized country in the empty network only wants to form
a bilateral free trade agreement with one of the non-unionized countries if and only if
T <
15a
149
. (ii) In the asymmetric setting with two countries unionized, the spoke unionized
country in the star network only wants to form a bilateral free trade agreement with the
non-unionized spoke country if and only if
63a
275
< T ≤
a
4
, while any unionized country in the
empty network never wants to form a bilateral free trade agreement with the non-unionized
country.
12
Pairwise stability only considers deviations on a single link at a time. For instance, it could be
that an agent would not benefit from severing any single link but would benefit from severing several
links simultaneously, and yet the network would still be pairwise stable. Players cannot be farsighted
in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Herings, Mauleon and
Vannetelbosch (2004) have proposed a general concept, social rationalizability, that predicts which
coalitions or networks are going to emerge among farsighted players.
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Under unionization, a large share of the profits of the domestic firm goes to the union
which diminishes its competitive advantage with respect to the non-unionized foreign firm.
Hence, the positive impact on social welfare of the home country due to greater access to
the foreign market can be relatively small compared to the large decrease on profits of the
domestic firm in the domestic market. Thus, the net impact on the social welfare of the
home country of a bilateral free trade agreement can be negative. This prevents sometimes
the unionized country from forming a bilateral free trade agreement with a non-unionized
country.
We are interested in the networks of free trade agreements that emerge in four different
settings: (i) no firm is unionized, (ii) one of the three firms is unionized, (iii) two of the
three firms are unionized and (iv) all firms are unionized. We first study pairwise stable
networks when all countries are non-unionized.
Proposition 1 Suppose all countries are non-unionized. The complete network g
c
is the
unique pairwise stable network.
Proposition 1 tells us which networks are pairwise stable when all firms are non-
unionized. As shown by Lemma 1, the empty network g
e
and the star network g
s
are
never stable because two symmetric countries have always incentives to form a bilateral
trade agreement. Thus, the complete network g
c
is always pairwise stable. Moreover, the
partial network g
p
is never stable because the isolated country and any of the two linked
countries have incentives to sign a free trade agreement. Proposition 1 shows that if
individual countries care about domestic social welfare then the formation of bilateral
trade agreements will generate a global free trade regime. In case individual countries care
only about domestic consumer surplus then bilateral trade agreements would also generate
a global free trade regime. Finally, regarding only domestic profits, the global free trade
regime is the unique pairwise stable network. This suggests that, in case of non-unionized
firms, firms will have no incentives to lobby against bilateral trade agreements. This
result contrasts with the result we obtain when all firms are unionized according to which
firms could, in some cases, have incentives to lobby against bilateral trade agreements.
This result also contrasts with Goyal and Joshi (2005) where tariffs are prohibitively high
between countries that do not have a bilateral free trade agreement. Indeed, given that
firm’s profit under autarky are higher than in any symmetric trading regime in which
every country has a given number of active firms, Goyal and Joshi (2005) have concluded
that firms will have incentives to lobby against bilateral free trade agreements.
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In our
13
This is the reason why they have obtained the result that a stable trading network is either a complete
network or consists of two components, one component has N −1 countries and is complete, and the other
component has a single country.
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model, the fact that tariffs are not prohibitive between countries that have not signed a
free trade agreement makes firms also preferring the free trade regime. So, there is no
conflict between firms’ objectives and social welfare maximizing countries: both countries
and firms support the free trade regime.
Belleflamme and Bloch (2004) have analyzed reciprocal market sharing agreements
by which firms commit not to enter each other’s territory in oligopolistic markets. Trade
agreements can be interpreted as the converse of market sharing agreements: trade agree-
ments open up foreign markets by abolishing tariffs whereas market sharing agreements
lead to the closure of foreign markets. They have shown that in the presence of trans-
portation costs when selling on a foreign market, only two different collusive networks
are pairwise stable in a linear Cournot oligopoly model: the complete network in which
any two firms collude, and the empty network in which no pair of firms colludes. But the
empty network (that corresponds to our complete network) is only stable for low enough
transportation (or tariff) costs. Thus, in their model firms could have incentives to lobby
against bilateral free trade agreements.
We now analyze which networks are pairwise stable when one country is unionized and
two countries are non-unionized.
Proposition 2 Suppose country k is unionized and countries i and j are non-unionized.
(i) If T ≤
5a
167
, then the complete network g
c
is the unique pairwise stable network. (ii) If
5a
167
< T ≤
a
4
, then the complete network g
c
and the partially connected network g
p
(ij) are
the only pairwise stable networks.
Proposition 2 shows the pairwise stable networks when the firm of country k is union-
ized and the firms of countries i and j are non-unionized. As shown by Lemma 1, the
empty network g
e
and the star network g
s
(k) are never stable because two symmetric non-
unionized countries have always incentives to form a bilateral trade agreement. By Lemma
2, the star networks g
s
(i) and g
s
(j) are never pairwise stable because the spoke unionized
country and the spoke non-unionized country have incentives to form a bilateral free trade
agreement. Thus, the complete network g
c
is always pairwise stable. By Lemma 2, the
partial networks g
p
(ik) and g
p
(jk) are not pairwise stable for
15a
149
< T ≤
a
4
because the
unionized country would have incentives to delete his link with the non-unionized country.
Moreover, for T ≤
15a
149
, the partial networks g
p
(ik) and g
p
(jk) are not pairwise stable
because the non-unionized countries have incentives to form a link moving to the star
network g
s
(i) or g
s
(j). Finally, the partially connected network g
p
(ij) is pairwise stable
if and only if
5a
167
< T ≤
a
4
because the unionized country has no incentives to sign a free
trade agreement with any of the linked non-unionized countries. The intuition is the same
as the one in Lemma 2. Under unionization, a large share of the profits of the domestic
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firm goes to the union which diminishes its competitive advantage with respect to the
non-unionized foreign firm. Hence, the positive effect due to greater access to the foreign
market is relatively small compared to the large negative effect on profits of the domestic
firm in the domestic market. This prevents the isolated unionized country from forming a
bilateral free trade agreement with any of the two linked non-unionized countries.
As in the previous symmetric case, the complete network is pairwise stable for any
degree of product market integration (for any T ≤
a
4
). This means that once the global
free trade regime has been formed it will prevail. But assume that countries start forming
bilateral free trade agreements from the empty network. In such case, the formation of a
first bilateral free trade agreement between the two non-unionized countries could impede
the formation of ulterior bilateral free trade agreements and therefore the constitution of
the free trade regime. In the next section we will analyze which pairwise stable networks
are likely to be reached from a situation in which no country has signed a free trade
agreement (in fact the empty network).
We now analyze which networks are pairwise stable when two countries are unionized
and one country is non-unionized.
Proposition 3 Suppose countries i and j are unionized and country k is non-unionized.
(i) If T ≤ T
′
 0.089a, then the partially connected network g
p
(ij) is the unique pairwise
stable network. (ii) If T
′
< T ≤
63a
275
, then the star networks g
s
(i) and g
s
(j) are the only
pairwise stable networks. (iii) If
63a
275
< T ≤
a
4
, then the complete network g
c
is the unique
pairwise stable network.
Proposition 3 tells us which networks are pairwise stable when the firms of countries i
and j are unionized and the firm of country k is non-unionized. As shown by Lemma 1,
the empty network g
e
and the star network g
s
(k) are never stable because two symmetric
non-unionized countries have always incentives to form a bilateral trade agreement. By
Lemma 2, the partial networks g
p
(ik) and g
p
(jk) are never pairwise stable because the
unionized country would have incentives to delete his link with the non-unionized country.
The star networks g
s
(i) and g
s
(j) are not pairwise stable for
63a
275
< T ≤
a
4
because the
spoke unionized country and the spoke non-unionized country have incentives to form a
bilateral free trade agreement. Thus, the complete network g
c
is always pairwise stable
for
63a
275
< T ≤
a
4
. Moreover, the star networks g
s
(i) and g
s
(j) are not pairwise stable
for T ≤ T
′
 0.089a, because the unionized hub country has incentives to delete his link
with the non-unionized spoke country moving to the partial network g
p
(ij). Then, the
star networks g
s
(i) and g
s
(j) are pairwise stable if and only if T
′
< T ≤
63a
275
. Finally,
the partial network g
p
(ij) is pairwise stable if and only if T ≤ T
′
 0.089a. For such
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values of T any unionized country has no incentive either to form a link with the isolated
non-unionized country or to delete the link with the other unionized country.
The fact that the partially connected network g
p
(ij) is pairwise stable only for high
enough degrees of product market integration can be explained as follows. Indeed, since
the profits of the unionized hub firm are increasing with T , the lower the degree of product
market integration the greater the incentives of any unionized linked country to form a link
with the isolated non-unionized country. Then, for small enough degrees of product market
integration the star network g
s
(i) or g
s
(j) will be formed. Any of these two star networks
is pairwise stable for T
′
< T ≤
63a
275
. Smaller degrees of product market integration give
incentives to the spoke unionized country to form a link with the spoke non-unionized
country moving to the complete network. Contrary to the previous cases, the complete
network is pairwise stable only for small enough degrees of product market integration,
63a
275
< T ≤
a
4
. Indeed, for such values of T , the firm of the spoke unionized country prefers
not to sell the good in the spoke non-unionized country. The formation of a bilateral free
trade agreement between both countries results then advantageous for both of them.
Finally, we analyze which networks are pairwise stable when all countries are unionized.
Proposition 4 Suppose all countries are unionized. The complete network g
c
is the unique
pairwise stable network.
Proposition 4 tells us that the complete network or global free trade is the unique
pairwise stable network when all firms are unionized. As shown by Lemma 1, the empty
network g
e
and the star network g
s
are never stable because two symmetric countries have
always incentives to form a bilateral trade agreement. Thus, the complete network g
c
is
always pairwise stable. Indeed, the welfare level of a country in the complete network
is independent of T . However, the welfare of the spoke countries in the star network is
decreasing with T . So, it is always better for the spoke countries to form a link. Moreover,
the partial network g
p
is never stable because the isolated country and any of the two
linked countries have incentives to sign a free trade agreement. Proposition 4 shows that
if individual countries care about domestic social welfare then the formation of bilateral
trade agreements makes stable the global free trade regime. In case individual countries
care only about domestic consumer surplus then bilateral trade agreements would make
stable the global free trade regime. However, regarding only domestic profits, the global
free trade regime would be stable only if the constant unit trade cost T is smaller than a
certain T
′′
<
a
4
; for values of T such that T
′′
< T ≤
a
4
, the partially connected network
would be the unique pairwise stable network. This suggests that, in some cases, firms
would have incentives to lobby against bilateral trade agreements. Finally, notice that
the complete network "survives" (in the sense that it remains pairwise stable for some
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values of the external tariffs) the introduction of asymmetries in countries (unionized
or non-unionized), and this could be seen as something positive for multilateral trade
liberalization.
4 Efficient networks and dynamic network formation
We now examine aggregate social welfare under the different networks. Remember that
aggregate social welfare SW (g) under a network g is given by SW (g) =
∑
i∈N
SW
i
(g).
We say that a network g is efficient if and only if SW (g) ≥ SW (g
′
) for all g
′
.
Contrary to the case of pairwise stable networks, there is a unique efficient network
in any of the four different settings: the complete network g
c
. Moreover, aggregate social
welfare is increasing with the number of links.
Proposition 5 In any of the four different settings, the complete network g
c
is the unique
efficient network and aggregate social welfare is increasing with the number of links.
Proposition 5 shows that, in case all firms are non-unionized, there is no conflict
between stability and efficiency. The complete network g
c
is both the unique pairwise
stable network and the efficient network. However, when only one country is unionized,
a conflict between pairwise stability and efficiency may occur (see Figure 2). Meanwhile
the efficient network is always pairwise stable, the reverse is not true since the partially
connected network g
p
(ij) is sometimes pairwise stable but is never efficient. When only
one country is non-unionized, a conflict between pairwise stability and efficiency occur
(see Figure 3). Indeed, for T ≤
63a
275
, the efficient network is never pairwise stable and vice
versa. Only for
63a
275
< T ≤
a
4
, the complete network g
c
is both the unique pairwise stable
network and the efficient network. In case all firms are unionized, there is no conflict
between stability and efficiency. The complete network g
c
is both the unique pairwise
stable network and the efficient network.
   
complete network
g
c
is
pairwise stable
complete network g
c
and
partially connected network g
p
(ij)
are pairwise stable
5a
167
15a
149
0
a
4
| |
| |
complete network g
c
(global free trade) is efficient
T
Figure 2: Conflict between stability and efficiency when only country k is unionized.
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   
partially connected
network g
p
(ij) is
pairwise stable
star networks
g
s
(i) and g
s
(j)
are pairwise stable
complete network
g
c
is
pairwise stable
T
′
63a
275
0
a
4
| | | |
| |
complete network g
c
(global free trade) is efficient
T
Figure 3: Conflict between stability and efficiency when only country k is non-unionized.
Finally, we explore which pairwise stable networks are likely to be reached from a
situation in which no country has signed a free trade agreement (in fact the empty net-
work). Such networks are called stable states. We first define the notions of improving
paths and stable states due to Jackson and Watts (2001, 2002). An improving path
14
from
a network g to a network g
′
is a finite sequence of networks g
1
, ..., g
K
with g
1
= g and
g
K
= g
′
such that for any k ∈ {1, ...,K−1} either: (i) g
k+1
= g
k
− ij for some ij such that
SW
i
(g
k
−ij) > SW
i
(g
k
), or (ii) g
k+1
= g
k
+ij for some ij such that SW
i
(g
k
+ij) > SW
i
(g
k
)
and SW
j
(g
k
+ ij) ≥ SW
j
(g
k
). An improving path is thus a sequence of networks that
might be observed in a dynamic process where agents are myopically adding and deleting
links.
15
A network g is a stable state if it is pairwise stable and there exists an improving
path connecting the empty network to g.
In case of symmetric countries, the complete network g
c
is the unique stable state.
However, once countries are asymmetric, a conflict between efficiency and stable states is
likely to occur.
Corollary 1 Suppose country k is unionized, countries i and j are non-unionized. (i) If
T ≤
5a
167
, then the complete network g
c
is the unique stable state. (ii) If
5a
167
< T ≤
15a
149
,
then the complete network g
c
and the partially connected network g
p
(ij) are the stable
states. (iii) If
15a
149
< T ≤
a
4
, then the partially connected network g
p
(ij) is the unique
stable state.
14
An improving path is a sequence of networks that can emerge when agents form or sever links based
on the improvement the resulting network offers relative to the current network. Each network in the
sequence differs by one link from the previous one. If a link is added, then the two agents involved must
both agree to its addition, with at least one of the two strictly benefiting from the addition of the link. If
a link is deleted, then it must be that at least one of the two agents involved in the link strictly benefits
from its deletion.
15
A network is pairwise stable if and only if it has no improving paths emanating from it.
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Corollary 2 Suppose countries i and j are unionized, country k is non-unionized. (i) If
T ≤ T
′
 0.089a, then the partially connected network g
p
(ij) is the unique stable state.
(ii) If T
′
< T ≤
63a
275
, then the star networks g
s
(i) and g
s
(j) are the stable states. (iii) If
63a
275
< T ≤
a
4
, then the complete network g
c
is the unique stable state.
We observe that, starting from the network in which no country has signed a free trade
agreement, sequences of networks due to continuously profitable deviations will not lead
in most cases to the global free trade network (complete network), even when global free
trade is pairwise stable. Remember that the global free trade network g
c
is the efficient
one. Thus, the conflict between stable states and efficient ones is far from being negligible
when countries are asymmetric.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have examined the formation of free trade agreements as a network for-
mation game. We have considered a three-country model in which international trade
occurs between economies with imperfectly competitive product markets. Labor markets
can be unionized and non-unionized in each country. We have shown that if all countries
are of the same type (all of them are either unionized or non-unionized), the global free
trade network is both the unique pairwise stable network and the unique efficient network.
If some countries are unionized while others are non-unionized, other networks apart from
the global free trade network are likely to be pairwise stable.
16
However, the efficient
network is always the global free trade network. Thus, a conflict between stability and
efficiency may occur. Moreover, starting from the network in which no country has signed
a free trade agreement, all sequences of networks due to continuously profitable devia-
tions do not lead (in most cases) to the global free trade network, even when global free
trade is stable. Finally, no monotonic relationship between the degree of product market
integration and the wage rate has been found.
Some extensions may be worthwhile. First, it would be interesting to treat the trade
regime, as well as the choice of external tariffs under each trade regime, as endogenous de-
cisions. We have concentrated on the incentives for liberalization on a non-discriminatory
basis by assuming that uniform non-discriminatory tariffs are applied by all countries on
16
The scope of the three-country analysis presented here is limited in that it does not include such
possibilities as, for instance, the formation of two free trade agreements between two unionized and two
non-unionized countries, respectively, where further liberalization implies a symmetric elimination of pref-
erential access in both bilateral arrangements. Thus, this unbalanced preferentialism (apart from the
existence of different types of countries) can also create problems per se for further liberalization.
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imports from other countries. We have also considered that external tariffs remain con-
stant with the formation of a free trade agreement. Since the World Trade Organization
precludes members of free trade areas from using these arrangements as a justification
to bypass their previous tariff bindings and raise external tariffs, one could allow for the
possibility that external tariffs decrease with the formation of a free trade agreement.
Second, it would be interesting to consider other objective functions for the countries. Kr-
ishna (1998) has shown that multilateral liberalization that is initially politically feasible
could be rendered infeasible by a preferential arrangement when the external tariffs to
non-members are fixed and countries maximize domestic firms’ profits. Ornelas (2005b)
has extended Krishna’s framework by endogenizing external tariffs to non-members and
assuming that governments maximize a welfare function that assigns a higher weight to
profits. He has shown that free trade agreements become then pure trade creating devices
(instead of trade diverting devices) that benefit non-member countries. As a result, the
free trade agreement may induce the non-member countries to withdraw their support to
a multilateral trade agreement. But Ornelas (2005b) has only compared the welfare of
non-member countries in the presence of a free trade agreement (our partial network),
with their welfare in a multilateral trade agreement (our complete network), without con-
sidering the possibility of any other trading regime (as our star network). Thus, it would
be very interesting to study the robustness of Krishna (1998) and Ornelas (2005b) results
when trading regimes are endogenized.
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Appendix A: All countries are non-unionized
The empty network.
Π
∗
i
(g
e
) =
3a
2
− 4aT + 12T
2
16b
,CS
∗
i
(g
e
) =
(3a− 2T )
2
32b
, CT
∗
i
(g
e
) =
(a− 2T)T
2b
SW
∗
i
(g
e
) =
(3a− 2T )(5a+ 2T )
32b
, SW
∗
(g
e
) =
3(3a− 2T)(5a+ 2T )
32b
The partially connected network.
For a linked country:
Π
∗
i
(g
p
) =
3a
2
+ 6T
2
16b
,CS
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(3a− T )
2
32b
,CT
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(a − 3T )T
4b
SW
∗
i
(g
p
) =
15a
2
+ 2aT − 11T
2
32b
For an isolated country:
Π
∗
i
(g
p
) =
3a
2
− 8aT + 22T
2
16b
,CS
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(3a− 2T )
2
32b
,CT
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(a− 2T )T
2b
SW
∗
i
(g
p
) =
15a
2
− 12aT + 16T
2
32b
and the global welfare is
SW
∗
(g
p
) =
45a
2
− 8aT − 6T
2
32b
The star network.
For a hub country:
Π
∗
i
(g
s
) =
3a
2
+ 4aT + 2T
2
16b
,CS
∗
i
(g
s
) =
9a
2
32b
,CT
∗
i
(g
s
) = 0
SW
∗
i
(g
s
) =
15a
2
+ 8aT + 4T
2
32b
For a spoke country:
Π
∗
i
(g
s
) =
3a
2
− 4aT + 10T
2
16b
,CS
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(3a− T )
2
32b
,CT
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(a− 3T )T
4b
SW
∗
i
(g
s
) =
15a
2
− 6aT − 3T
2
32b
and the global welfare is
SW
∗
(g
s
) =
45a
2
− 4aT − 2T
2
32b
The complete network.
Π
∗
i
(g
c
) =
3a
2
16b
,CS
∗
i
(g
c
) =
9a
2
32b
, CT
∗
i
(g
c
) = 0, SW
∗
i
(g
c
) =
15a
2
32b
, SW
∗
(g
c
) =
45a
2
32b
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Appendix B: One country is unionized, two countries are
non-unionized
The empty network.
For the unionized country:
U
∗
i
(g
e
) =
(3a− 2T)
2
144b
,W
∗
i
(g
e
) =
3a− 2T
18
,Π
∗
i
(g
e
) =
3a
2
− 4aT + 44T
2
64b
CS
∗
i
(g
e
) =
289(3a − 2T )
2
10368b
,CT
∗
i
(g
e
) =
(21a− 38T )T
36b
SW
∗
i
(g
e
) =
(3a− 2T)(1245a+ 1186T )
10368b
For a non-unionized country:
Π
∗
i
(g
e
) =
441a
2
− 588aT + 1348T
2
1728b
,CS
∗
i
(g
e
) =
289(3a− 2T )
2
10368b
CT
∗
i
(g
e
) =
(15a− 34T )T
36b
, SW
∗
i
(g
e
) =
(3a− 2T )(1749a+ 274T )
10368b
and the global welfare is
SW
∗
(g
e
) =
17(3a − 2T )(93a + 34T )
3456b
The partially connected network.
Suppose the isolated country is non-unionized. For a linked unionized country:
U
∗
i
(g
p
) =
a
2
16b
,W
∗
i
(g
p
) =
a
6
,Π
∗
i
(g
p
) =
3(a
2
+ 8T
2
)
64b
, CS
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(17a− 6T )
2
1152b
CT
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(7a− 18T )T
24b
, SW
∗
i
(g
p
) =
415a
2
+ 132aT − 396T
2
1152b
For a linked non-unionized country:
Π
∗
i
(g
p
) =
49a
2
+ 72T
2
192b
,CS
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(17a− 6T )
2
1152b
, CT
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(7a − 18T)T
24b
SW
∗
i
(g
p
) =
11(53a
2
+ 12aT − 36T
2
)
1152b
For the isolated non-unionized country:
Π
∗
i
(g
p
) =
49a
2
− 112aT + 264T
2
192b
, CS
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(17a− 12T )
2
1152b
,CT
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(5a− 12T )T
12b
SW
∗
i
(g
p
) =
583a
2
− 600aT + 576T
2
1152b
and the global welfare is
SW
∗
(g
p
) =
527a
2
− 112aT − 72T
2
384b
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When the isolated country is unionized, we should distinguish two cases.
[Case 1] T ≤
3a
14
For a linked non-unionized country:
Π
∗
i
(g
p
) =
441a
2
− 168aT + 664T
2
1728b
,CS
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(51a − 14T )
2
10368b
,CT
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(3a− 14T )T
24b
SW
∗
i
(g
p
) =
5247a
2
− 1140aT − 1868T
2
10368b
For the isolated unionized country:
U
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(3a− 4T )
2
144b
,Π
∗
i
(g
p
) =
3a
2
− 8aT + 72T
2
64b
,CS
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(51a− 32T )
2
10368b
W
∗
i
(g
p
) =
3a− 4T
18
, CT
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(21a− 40T )T
36b
, SW
∗
i
(g
p
) =
5(747a
2
− 48aT + 464T
2
)
10368b
and the global welfare is
SW
∗
(g
p
) =
4743a
2
− 840aT − 472T
2
3456b
[Case 2]
3a
14
< T ≤
a
4
. Then, X
∗
ij
(g
p
) = X
∗
ik
(g
p
) = 0, i = j, i = k, when i denotes the
unionized spoke country.
For a linked non-unionized country:
Π
∗
i
(g
p
) =
177a
2
− 140aT + 100T
2
576b
,CS
∗
i
(g
p
) =
2a
2
9b
,CT
∗
i
(g
p
) = 0
SW
∗
i
(g
p
) =
5(61a
2
− 28aT + 20T
2
)
576b
For the isolated unionized country:
U
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(a+ 2T )
2
48b
,W
∗
j
(g
p
) =
a+ 2T
6
,Π
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(a + 2T )
2
64b
,CS
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(17a − 14T )
2
1152b
CT
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(7a − 10T )T
12b
, SW
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(331a− 298T )(a+ 2T )
1152b
and the global welfare is
SW
∗
(g
p
) =
(33a − 14T )(47a+ 14T )
1152b
The star network.
Suppose the hub country is unionized. For the unionized hub country:
U
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(3a+ 2T )
2
144b
,W
∗
i
(g
s
) =
3a+ 2T
18
,Π
∗
i
(g
s
) =
3a
2
+ 4aT + 4T
2
64b
CS
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(51a − 2T )
2
10368b
,CT
∗
i
(g
s
) = 0, SW
∗
i
(g
s
) =
3735a
2
+ 1308aT + 940T
2
10368b
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For a non-unionized spoke country:
Π
∗
i
(g
s
) =
7(63a
2
− 60aT + 148T
2
)
1728b
,CS
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(51a− 20T )
2
10368b
, CT
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(21a− 52T )T
72b
SW
∗
i
(g
s
) =
5247a
2
− 1536aT − 872T
2
10368b
and the global welfare is:
SW
∗
(g
s
) =
4743a
2
− 588aT − 268T
2
3456b
When the hub country is non-unionized, we should distinguish two cases.
[Case 1] T ≤
3a
16
For the unionized spoke country:
U
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(3a− 2T )
2
144b
,W
∗
i
(g
s
) =
3a− 2T
18
,Π
∗
i
(g
s
) =
3a
2
− 4aT + 36T
2
64b
CS
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(51a− 16T )
2
10368b
,CT
∗
i
(g
s
) =
7T(3a− 8T )
72b
, SW
∗
i
(g
s
) =
3735a
2
− 120aT − 1688T
2
10368b
For the non-unionized hub country:
Π
∗
i
(g
s
) =
441a
2
+ 420aT + 172T
2
)
1728b
, CS
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(51a+ 2T )
2
10368b
, CT
∗
i
(g
s
) = 0
SW
∗
i
(g
s
) =
5247a
2
+ 2724aT + 1036T
2
10368b
For the non-unionized spoke country:
Π
∗
i
(g
s
) =
441a
2
− 588aT + 1132T
2
)
1728b
,CS
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(51a− 16T)
2
10368b
CT
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(3a− 16T )T
24b
, SW
∗
i
(g
s
) =
5247a
2
− 3864aT + 136T
2
10368b
and the global welfare is
SW
∗
(g
s
) =
4743a
2
− 420aT − 172T
2
3456b
[Case 2]
3a
16
< T ≤
a
4
. Then, X
∗
ik
(g
s
(j)) = 0, i = k, when i denotes the unionized country.
For the unionized spoke country:
U
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(2a+ T )
2
96b
,W
∗
i
(g
s
) =
2a+ T
12
,Π
∗
i
(g
s
) =
4a
2
+ 4aT + 5T
2
128b
CS
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(34a− 13T )
2
4608b
,CT
∗
i
(g
s
) =
7T(2a− 5T )
48b
, SW
∗
i
(g
s
) =
1492a
2
+ 796aT − 2963T
2
4608b
For the non-unionized hub country:
Π
∗
i
(g
s
) =
324a
2
+ 196aT + 85T
2
)
1152b
,CS
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(34a− T )
2
4608b
,CT
∗
i
(g
s
) = 0
SW
∗
i
(g
s
) =
2452a
2
+ 716aT + 341T
2
4608b
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For the non-unionized spoke player:
Π
∗
i
(g
s
) =
324a
2
− 476aT + 613T
2
)
1152b
,CS
∗
i
(g
s
) =
2a
2
9b
,CT
∗
i
(g
s
) = 0
SW
∗
i
(g
s
) =
580a
2
− 476aT + 613T
2
1152b
and the global welfare is
SW
∗
(g
s
) =
3132a
2
− 196aT − 85T
2
2304b
The complete network.
For the unionized country:
U
∗
i
(g
c
) =
a
2
16b
,W
∗
i
(g
c
) =
a
6
,Π
∗
i
(g
c
) =
3a
2
64b
,CS
∗
i
(g
c
) =
289a
2
1152b
,CT
∗
i
(g
c
) = 0
SW
∗
i
(g
c
) =
415a
2
1152b
For the non-unionized country:
Π
∗
i
(g
c
) =
49a
2
192b
,CS
∗
i
(g
c
) =
289a
2
1152b
,CT
∗
i
(g
c
) = 0, SW
∗
i
(g
c
) =
583a
2
1152b
and the global welfare is
SW
∗
(g
c
) =
527a
2
384b
Appendix C: Two countries are unionized, one is non-unionized
The empty network.
For the unionized country:
U
∗
i
(g
e
) =
(3a− 2T )
2
100b
,W
∗
i
(g
e
) =
3a− 2T
15
,Π
∗
i
(g
e
) =
81a
2
− 108aT + 836T
2
1200b
CS
∗
i
(g
e
) =
169(3a− 2T )
2
7200b
, CT
∗
i
(g
e
) =
(a− 2T )T
2b
, SW
∗
i
(g
e
) =
(3a− 2T )(177a+ 122T )
1440b
For the non-unionized country:
Π
∗
i
(g
e
) =
147a
2
− 196aT + 332T
2
400b
, CS
∗
i
(g
e
) =
169(3a− 2T )
2
7200b
,
CT
∗
i
(g
e
) =
(9a− 26T )T
30b
, SW
∗
i
(g
e
) =
(1389a− 206T )(3a− 2T )
7200b
and the global welfare is
SW
∗
(g
e
) =
13(3a − 2T )(81a + 26T )
2400b
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The partially connected network.
Suppose the isolated country is unionized. For the linked unionized country:
U
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(21a − 4T )
2
4900b
,W
∗
i
(g
p
) =
a
5
−
4T
105
,Π
∗
i
(g
p
) =
9(147a
2
− 56aT + 822T
2
)
19600b
CS
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(39a − 11T)
2
7200b
,CT
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(63a− 247T )T
420b
SW
∗
i
(g
p
) =
3717a
2
− 294aT − 1921T
2
10080b
For the isolated unionized country:
U
∗
i
(g
p
) =
9(7a− 8T )
2
4900b
,W
∗
i
(g
p
) =
7a− 8T
35
,Π
∗
i
(g
p
) =
3969a
2
− 9072aT + 66434T
2
58800b
CS
∗
i
(g
p
) =
169(3a− 2T )
2
7200b
,CT
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(21a − 46T )T
42b
SW
∗
i
(g
p
) =
3717a
2
− 1428aT + 2480T
2
10080b
For the linked non-unionized country:
Π
∗
i
(g
p
) =
441a
2
− 168aT + 466T
2
1200b
,CS
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(39a− 11T )
2
7200b
CT
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(63a− 247T )T
420b
, SW
∗
i
(g
p
) =
29169a
2
− 5502aT − 9221T
2
50400b
and the global welfare is
SW
∗
(g
p
) =
1053a
2
− 224aT − 102T
2
800b
Suppose the isolated country is non-unionized. For the linked unionized country:
U
∗
i
(g
p
) =
9a
2
100b
,W
∗
i
(g
p
) =
a
5
,Π
∗
i
(g
p
) =
3(9a
2
+ 50T
2
)
400b
, CS
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(13a− 5T )
2
800b
CT
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(7a− 15T )T
20b
, SW
∗
i
(g
p
) =
59a
2
+ 30aT − 55T
2
160b
For the isolated non-unionized country:
Π
∗
i
(g
p
) =
147a
2
− 280aT + 550T
2
400b
,CS
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(13a− 10T )
2
800b
CT
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(3a − 10T )T
10b
, SW
∗
i
(g
p
) =
463a
2
− 580aT + 400T
2
800b
and the global welfare is
SW
∗
(g
p
) =
1053a
2
− 280aT − 150T
2
800b
The star network.
Suppose the hub country is non-unionized. We distinguish two cases.
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[Case 1] T ≤
9a
41
For the unionized spoke country:
U
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(3a− 2T )
2
100b
,W
∗
i
(g
s
) =
3a − 2T
15
,Π
∗
i
(g
s
) =
81a
2
− 108aT + 686T
2
1200b
CS
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(39a− 11T )
2
7200b
, CT
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(9a− 41T )T
60b
, SW
∗
i
(g
s
) =
531a
2
− 258aT − 79T
2
1440b
For the non-unionized hub country:
Π
∗
i
(g
s
) =
441a
2
+ 252aT + 86T
2
1200b
,CS
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(39a+ 4T )
2
7200b
, CT
∗
i
(g
s
) = 0
SW
∗
i
(g
s
) =
4167a
2
+ 1824aT + 532T
2
7200b
and the global welfare is
SW
∗
(g
s
) =
3159a
2
− 252aT − 86T
2
2400b
[Case 2]
9a
41
< T ≤
a
4
. Then, X
∗
ij
(g
s
) = X
∗
ji
(g
s
) = 0, i = j, when i and j are the unionized
countries.
For the unionized spoke country:
U
∗
i
(g
s
) =
833a
2
11532b
,W
∗
i
(g
s
) =
7a
31
,Π
∗
i
(g
s
) =
7225a
2
138384b
CS
∗
i
(g
s
) =
3025a
2
17298b
,CT
∗
i
(g
s
) = 0, SW
∗
i
(g
s
) =
13807a
2
46128b
For the non-unionized hub country:
Π
∗
i
(g
s
) =
64433a
2
138384b
,CS
∗
i
(g
s
) =
6241a
2
30752b
,CT
∗
i
(g
s
) = 0, SW
∗
i
(g
s
) =
185035a
2
276768b
and the global welfare is
SW
∗
(g
s
) =
350719a
2
276768b
Suppose the hub player is unionized. We distinguish two cases.
[Case 1] T ≤
63a
275
For the unionized hub country:
U
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(21a+ 10T )
2
4900b
,W
∗
i
(g
s
) =
a
5
+
2T
21
,Π
∗
i
(g
s
) =
3969a
2
+ 3780aT + 3350T
2
58800b
CS
∗
i
(g
s
) =
169a
2
800b
,CT
∗
i
(g
s
) = 0, SW
∗
i
(g
s
) =
1239a
2
+ 504aT + 260T
2
3360b
For the unionized spoke country:
U
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(21a− 10T )
2
4900b
,W
∗
i
(g
s
) =
a
5
−
2T
21
,Π
∗
i
(g
s
) =
3969a
2
− 3780aT + 32750T
2
)
58800b
CS
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(13a− 5T )
2
800b
,CT
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(7a− 15T)T
20b
, SW
∗
i
(g
s
) =
1239a
2
+ 126aT − 475T
2
3360b
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For the non-unionized spoke country:
Π
∗
i
(g
s
) =
147a
2
− 140aT + 250T
2
400b
,CS
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(13a− 5T )
2
800b
,CT
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(63a − 275T )T
420b
SW
∗
i
(g
s
) =
9723a
2
− 6090aT + 25T
2
16800b
and the global welfare is
SW
∗
(g
s
) =
1053a
2
− 140aT − 50T
2
800b
[Case 2]
63a
275
< T ≤
a
4
. Then, X
∗
ik
(g
s
(j)) = 0, i = k, when i denotes the unionized spoke
country.
For the unionized hub country:
U
∗
i
(g
s
) =
13(22a+ 7T )
2
62424b
,W
∗
i
(g
s
) =
22a+ 7T
102
,Π
∗
i
(g
s
) =
9302a
2
+ 4578aT + 6523T
2
124848b
CS
∗
i
(g
s
) =
25(79a− 5T )
2
749088b
,CT
∗
i
(g
s
) = 0, SW
∗
i
(g
s
) =
287341a
2
+ 55766aT + 47407T
2
749088b
For the unionized spoke country:
U
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(62a+ 29T )
2
62424b
,W
∗
i
(g
s
) =
62a + 29T
306
,Π
∗
i
(g
s
) =
1922a
2
+ 1978aT + 1721T
2
)
41616b
CS
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(395a− 178T )
2
749088b
,CT
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(217a− 434T )T
612b
SW
∗
i
(g
s
) =
236749a
2
+ 200504aT − 458462T
2
749088b
For the non-unionized spoke country:
Π
∗
i
(g
s
) =
51894a
2
− 56854aT + 63059T
2
124848b
,CS
∗
i
(g
s
) =
49(26a − T )
2
187272b
CT
∗
i
(g
s
) = 0, SW
∗
i
(g
s
) =
221930a
2
− 175658aT + 189275T
2
374544b
and the global welfare is
SW
∗
(g
s
) =
322650a
2
− 31682aT − 10835T
2
249696b
The complete network.
For the unionized country:
U
∗
i
(g
c
) =
9a
2
100b
,W
∗
i
(g
c
) =
a
5
,Π
∗
i
(g
c
) =
27a
2
400b
, CS
∗
i
(g
c
) =
169a
2
800b
CT
∗
i
(g
c
) = 0, SW
∗
i
(g
c
) =
59a
2
160b
For the non-unionized country:
Π
∗
i
(g
c
) =
147a
2
400b
, CS
∗
i
(g
c
) =
169a
2
800b
,CT
∗
i
(g
c
) = 0, SW
∗
i
(g
c
) =
463a
2
800b
27
and the global welfare is
SW
∗
(g
c
) =
1053a
2
800b
Appendix D: All countries are unionized
The empty network.
U
∗
i
(g
e
) =
(3a− 2T )
2
64b
,W
∗
i
(g
e
) =
6a− 4T
24
,Π
∗
i
(g
e
) =
81a− 108aT + 548T
2
768b
CS
∗
i
(g
e
) =
9(3a− 2T)
2
512b
,CT
∗
i
(g
e
) =
(9a − 22T )T
24b
, SW
∗
i
(g
e
) =
3(3a− 2T )(23a+ 6T )
512b
SW
∗
(g
e
) =
9(3a− 2T)(23a+ 6T)
512b
The partially connected network.
For a linked country:
U
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(21a− 4T )
2
3136b
,W
∗
i
(g
p
) =
21a− 4T
84
,Π
∗
i
(g
p
) =
9(147a
2
− 56aT + 528T
2
)
12544b
CS
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(27a− 8T )
2
4608b
, CT
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(63a− 200T )T
336b
, SW
∗
i
(g
p
) =
13041a
2
− 6368T
2
32256b
For an isolated country:
U
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(21a− 20T )
2
3136b
,W
∗
i
(g
p
) =
21a− 20T
84
,Π
∗
i
(g
p
) =
3969a
2
− 7560aT + 42800T
2
37632b
CS
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(27a− 20T )
2
4608b
,CT
∗
i
(g
p
) =
(21a− 60T )T
56b
SW
∗
i
(g
p
) =
13041a
2
− 10584aT + 9040T
2
32256b
and the global welfare is
SW
∗
(g
p
) =
1863a
2
− 504aT − 176T
2
1536b
The star network.
For the hub country:
U
∗
i
(g
s
) =
9(7a+ 2T )
2
3136b
,W
∗
i
(g
s
) =
7a+ 2T
28
,Π
∗
i
(g
s
) =
3969a
2
+ 2268aT + 1892T
2
37632b
CS
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(27a+ 2T )
2
4608b
,CT
∗
i
(g
s
) = 0, SW
∗
i
(g
s
) =
13041a
2
+ 5292aT + 2020T
2
32256b
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For the spoke countries:
U
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(21a− 10T )
2
3136b
,W
∗
i
(g
s
) =
21a − 10T
84
,Π
∗
i
(g
s
) =
3969a
2
− 3780aT + 21284T
2
37632b
CS
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(27a− 10T )
2
4608b
,CT
∗
i
(g
s
) =
(63a − 226T )T
336b
SW
∗
i
(g
s
) =
13041a
2
− 5292aT − 1724T
2
32256b
and the global welfare is
SW
∗
(g
s
) =
1863a
2
− 252aT − 68T
2
1536b
The complete network.
U
∗
i
(g
c
) =
9a
2
64b
,W
∗
i
(g
c
) =
a
4
,Π
∗
i
(g
c
) =
27a
2
256b
,CS
∗
i
(g
c
) =
81a
2
512b
CT
∗
i
(g
c
) = 0, SW
∗
i
(g
c
) =
207a
2
512b
, SW
∗
(g
c
) =
621a
2
512b
Appendix E: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.
We analyze first the case in which all countries are non-unionized.
In such case, two countries in the empty network g
e
have a symmetric position. Since
SW
∗
i
(g
p
) =
15a
2
+ 2aT − 11T
2
32b
>
(3a− 2T)(5a+ 2T )
32b
= SW
∗
i
(g
e
), with i ∈ N(g
p
),
for all T <
6a
7
, it follows that SW
∗
i
(g
p
) > SW
∗
i
(g
e
) and SW
∗
j
(g
p
) > SW
∗
j
(g
e
) with ij ∈ g
p
.
Thus, any pair of countries in the empty network would like to form a bilateral free trade
agreement.
Also two spoke countries in the star network g
s
have a symmetric position. Since
SW
∗
i
(g
c
) =
15a
2
32b
>
15a
2
− 6aT − 3T
2
32b
= SW
∗
i
(g
s
)
for all T > 0, with ij /∈ g
s
, it follows that SW
∗
i
(g
c
) > SW
∗
i
(g
s
) and SW
∗
j
(g
c
) > SW
∗
j
(g
s
)
with ij /∈ g
s
. Thus, the two spoke countries in the star network would like to form a
bilateral free trade agreement.
We analyze now the case in which two countries are non-unionized.
In such case, two non-unionized countries in the empty network g
e
have a symmetric
position.
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(i) We consider first the case where T ≤
3a
14
. Since
SW
∗
i
(g
p
(ij)) =
5247a
2
− 1140aT − 1868T
2
10368b
>
(3a − 2T )(1749a+ 274T)
10368b
= SW
∗
i
(g
e
),
for all T <
64a
55
, with ij ∈ g
p
, it follows that SW
∗
i
(g
p
(ij)) > SW
∗
i
(g
e
) and SW
∗
j
(g
p
(ij)) >
SW
∗
j
(g
e
).
(ii) Next, we consider the case where
3a
14
< T ≤
a
4
. Since
SW
∗
i
(g
p
(ij)) =
5(61a
2
− 28aT + 20T
2
)
576b
>
(3a− 2T)(1749a+ 274T )
10368b
= SW
∗
i
(g
e
),
for all T > 0, with ij ∈ g
p
, it follows that SW
∗
i
(g
p
(ij)) > SW
∗
i
(g
e
) and SW
∗
j
(g
p
(ij)) >
SW
∗
j
(g
e
).
Also two spoke non-unionized countries in the star network g
s
(k) have a symmetric posi-
tion. Since
SW
∗
i
(g
c
) =
583a
2
1152b
>
5247a
2
− 1536aT − 872T
2
10368b
= SW
∗
i
(g
s
(k))
for all T > 0, with ij /∈ g
s
(k), it follows that SW
∗
i
(g
c
) > SW
∗
i
(g
s
(k)) and SW
∗
j
(g
c
) >
SW
∗
j
(g
s
(k)) with ij /∈ g
s
(k).
We analyze now the case in which two countries are unionized.
In such case, two unionized countries in the empty network g
e
have a symmetric position.
Since
SW
∗
i
(g
p
(ij)) =
59a
2
+ 30aT − 55T
2
160b
>
(3a− 2T )(177a+ 122T )
1440b
= SW
∗
i
(g
e
)
for all T <
258a
251
, with ij ∈ g
p
, it follows that SW
∗
i
(g
p
(ij)) > SW
∗
i
(g
e
) and SW
∗
j
(g
p
(ij)) >
SW
∗
j
(g
e
) with ij ∈ g
p
(ij).
Also two spoke unionized countries in the star network g
s
(k) have a symmetric position.
(i) We consider first the case where T ≤
9a
41
. Since
SW
∗
i
(g
s
(k)) =
531a
2
− 258aT − 79T
2
1440b
<
59a
2
160b
= SW
∗
i
(g
c
)
for all T > 0, with ij /∈ g
s
(k), it follows that SW
∗
i
(g
s
(k)) < SW
∗
i
(g
c
) and SW
∗
j
(g
s
(k)) <
SW
∗
j
(g
c
).
(ii) Next, we consider the case where
9a
41
< T ≤
a
4
. Since
SW
∗
i
(g
s
(k)) =
13807a
2
46128b
<
59a
2
160b
= SW
∗
i
(g
c
)
with ij /∈ g
s
(k), it follows that SW
∗
i
(g
s
(k)) < SW
∗
i
(g
c
) and SW
∗
j
(g
s
(k)) < SW
∗
j
(g
c
).
Finally, we analyze the case in which all countries are unionized.
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In such case, two countries in the empty network g
e
have a symmetric position. Since
SW
∗
i
(g
p
) =
13041a
2
− 6368T
2
32256b
>
3(3a− 2T)(23a+ 6T)
512b
= SW
∗
i
(g
e
), with ij ∈ g
p
,
for all T <
1323a
1025
, it follows that SW
∗
i
(g
p
) > SW
∗
i
(g
e
) and SW
∗
j
(g
p
) > SW
∗
j
(g
e
) with
ij ∈ g
p
.
Also two spoke countries in the star network g
s
have a symmetric position. Since
SW
∗
i
(g
c
) =
207a
2
512b
>
13041a
2
− 5292aT − 1724T
2
32256b
= SW
∗
i
(g
s
)
for all T > 0, with ij /∈ g
s
, it follows that SW
∗
i
(g
c
) > SW
∗
i
(g
s
) and SW
∗
j
(g
c
) > SW
∗
j
(g
s
)
with ij /∈ g
s
.
Proof of Lemma 2.
We analyze first the case in which two countries are non-unionized.
In such case, the unionized country and any non-unionized country in the empty network
g
e
have a symmetric position. Since
SW
∗
i
(g
p
) =
415a
2
+ 132aT − 396T
2
1152b
>
(3a− 2T)(1245a+ 1186T )
10368b
= SW
∗
i
(g
e
), with ij ∈ g
p
,
for all T <
15a
149
, it follows that the unionized country only would like to form a link with
a non-unionized country iff T <
15a
149
.
Also the spoke unionized country and a spoke non-unionized country in the star network
g
s
have a symmetric position.
(i) We consider first the case where T ≤
3a
16
. Since
SW
∗
i
(g
c
) =
583a
2
1152b
>
5247a
2
− 3864aT + 136T
2
10368b
= SW
∗
i
(g
s
(j))
for all T <
483a
17
, where i, j represent the two non-unionized countries, i = j, and
SW
∗
k
(g
c
) =
415a
2
1152b
>
3735a
2
− 120aT − 1688T
2
10368b
= SW
∗
k
(g
s
(j))
for all T > 0, with k the unionized country, it follows that SW
∗
i
(g
c
) > SW
∗
i
(g
s
) and
SW
∗
k
(g
c
) > SW
∗
k
(g
s
) with ik /∈ g
s
.
(ii) Next, we consider the case where
3a
16
< T ≤
a
4
. Since
SW
∗
i
(g
c
) =
583a
2
1152b
>
580a
2
− 476aT + 613T
2
1152b
= SW
∗
i
(g
s
(j))
for all T < 0.783a, where i, j represent the two non-unionized countries, i = j, and
SW
∗
k
(g
c
) =
415a
2
1152b
>
1492a
2
+ 796aT − 2963T
2
4608b
= SW
∗
k
(g
s
(j))
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for all T > 0, with k the unionized country, it follows that SW
∗
i
(g
c
) > SW
∗
i
(g
s
) and
SW
∗
k
(g
c
) > SW
∗
k
(g
s
) with ik /∈ g
s
.
We analyze next the case in which two countries are unionized.
In such case, any unionized country and the non-unionized country in the empty network
g
e
have a symmetric position. Since
SW
∗
i
(g
p
(ik)) =
3717a
2
− 294aT − 1921T
2
10080b
<
(3a− 2T)(177a+ 122T )
1440b
= SW
∗
i
(g
e
),
for all T > 0, when i is any unionized country and k is the non-unionized country, it follows
that any unionized country never wants to form a link with the non-unionized country in
the empty network.
Also a spoke unionized country and the spoke non-unionized country in the star network
g
s
have a symmetric position.
(i) We consider first the case where T ≤
63a
275
. Since
SW
∗
i
(g
c
) =
59a
2
160b
<
1239a
2
+ 126aT − 475T
2
3360b
= SW
∗
i
(g
s
(j))
for all T <
126a
475
, where i, j represent the two unionized countries, i = j, it follows that
the spoke unionized country does not want to form a link with the non-unionized spoke
country.
(ii) Next, we consider the case where
63a
275
< T ≤
a
4
. Since
SW
∗
i
(g
c
) =
59a
2
160b
>
236749a
2
+ 200504aT − 458462T
2
749088b
= SW
∗
i
(g
s
(j))
for all T > 0, where i, j represent the two unionized countries, i = j, and
SW
∗
k
(g
c
) =
463a
2
800b
>
221930a
2
− 175658aT + 189275T
2
374544b
= SW
∗
k
(g
s
(j))
for all 0.0304 < T < 0.898a, it follows that both the unionized and the non-unionized
spoke countries would like to form a link between them.
Proof of Proposition 1.
By Lemma 1, the empty network g
e
and the star network g
s
are never pairwise stable
since two symmetric countries of the same type always want to form a bilateral free trade
agreement. Thus, the complete network g
c
is always pairwise stable, since no pair of
countries i and j have incentives to delete their link ij ∈ g
c
.
The partially connected network g
p
is never pairwise stable because the isolated country
and any of the two linked countries have incentives to sign a free trade agreement, i.e.,
SW
∗
i
(g
p
) < SW
∗
i
(g
s
) and SW
∗
j
(g
p
) < SW
∗
j
(g
s
) with ij /∈ g
p
, ij ∈ g
s
, and j /∈ N(g
p
).
Since
SW
∗
j
(g
p
) =
15a
2
− 12aT + 16T
2
32b
<
15a
2
− 6aT − 3T
2
32b
= SW
∗
j
(g
s
)
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for all T <
6a
19
, and
SW
∗
i
(g
p
) =
15a
2
+ 2aT − 11T
2
32b
<
15a
2
+ 8aT + 4T
2
32b
= SW
∗
i
(g
s
),
for all T > 0, g
p
is never pairwise stable.
Proof of Proposition 2.
By Lemma 1, the empty network g
e
and the star network g
s
(k) are never stable because
two symmetric non-unionized countries have always incentives to form a bilateral trade
agreement. By Lemma 2, the star networks g
s
(i) and g
s
(j) are never pairwise stable
because the spoke unionized country and the spoke non-unionized country have incentives
to form a bilateral free trade agreement. Thus, the complete network g
c
is always pairwise
stable.
By Lemma 2, the partial networks g
p
(ik) and g
p
(jk) are not pairwise stable for
15a
149
<
T ≤
a
4
because the unionized country would have incentives to delete his link with the
non-unionized country. Moreover, for T ≤
15a
149
, the partial networks g
p
(ik) and g
p
(jk)
are not pairwise stable because the non-unionized countries have incentives to form a link
moving to the star network g
s
(i) or g
s
(j). Indeed,
SW
∗
i
(g
p
(jk)) =
583a
2
− 600aT + 576T
2
1152b
<
5247a
2
− 3864aT + 136T
2
10368b
= SW
∗
i
(g
s
(j))
for all T <
192a
631
, when i is the isolated non-unionized country in g
p
(jk), and
SW
∗
j
(g
p
(jk)) =
11(53a
2
+ 12aT − 36T
2
)
1152b
<
5247a
2
+ 2724aT + 1036T
2
10368b
= SW
∗
j
(g
s
(j))
for all T > 0, when j is the linked non-unionized country in g
p
(jk). Then, the network
g
p
(jk) (and g
p
(ik)) is not pairwise stable.
Finally, the partially connected network g
p
(ij) is pairwise stable if and only if
5a
167
<
T ≤
a
4
because the unionized country has no incentives to sign a free trade agreement with
any of the linked non-unionized countries. To show that the network g
p
(ij) is pairwise
stable, we have to show that SW
∗
i
(g
p
(ij)) > SW
∗
i
(g
s
(i)), or SW
∗
k
(g
p
(ij)) > SW
∗
k
(g
s
(i))
for all values of T in the interval.
(i) We consider first the case where T ≤
3a
16
. Since
SW
∗
k
(g
p
(ij)) =
5(747a
2
− 48aT + 464T
2
)
10368b
>
3735a
2
− 120aT − 1688T
2
10368b
= SW
∗
k
(g
s
(i));
for all T >
5a
167
, and
SW
∗
i
(g
p
(ij)) =
5247a
2
− 1140aT − 1868T
2
10368b
<
5247a
2
+ 2724aT + 1036T
2
10368b
= SW
∗
i
(g
s
(i)),
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for all T > 0, it follows that g
p
(ij) is pairwise stable if and only if
5a
167
< T ≤
3a
16
. Otherwise,
for T ≤
5a
167
, the network g
p
(ij) is not pairwise stable because any non-unionized linked
country and the unionized isolated country will have incentives to form a link between
them moving to the star network g
s
(i) or g
s
(j).
(ii) Second, we consider the case where
3a
16
< T ≤
3a
14
. Since
SW
∗
k
(g
p
(ij)) =
5(747a
2
− 48aT + 464T
2
)
10368b
>
1492a
2
+ 796aT − 2963T
2
4608b
= SW
∗
k
(g
s
(i));
for all T > 0, and
SW
∗
i
(g
p
(ij)) =
5247a
2
− 1140aT − 1868T
2
10368b
<
2452a
2
+ 716aT + 341T
2
4608b
= SW
∗
i
(g
s
(i)),
for all T > 0, it follows that g
p
(ij) is pairwise stable for
3a
16
< T ≤
3a
14
.
(iii) Finally, we consider the case where
3a
14
< T ≤
a
4
. Since
SW
∗
k
(g
p
(ij)) =
(331a− 298T)(a+ 2T )
1152b
>
1492a
2
+ 796aT − 2963T
2
4608b
= SW
∗
k
(g
s
(i));
for all T > 0.214a, and
SW
∗
i
(g
p
(ij)) =
5(61a
2
− 28aT + 20T
2
)
576b
<
2452a
2
+ 716aT + 341T
2
4608b
= SW
∗
i
(g
s
(i)),
for all T < 4.01a, i = B,C, it follows that g
p
(ij) is pairwise stable for
3a
14
< T ≤
a
4
.
Proof of Proposition 3.
As shown by Lemma 1, the empty network g
e
and the star network g
s
(k) are never stable
because two symmetric unionized countries have always incentives to form a bilateral
trade agreement. By Lemma 2, the partial networks g
p
(ik) and g
p
(jk) are never pairwise
stable because the unionized country would have incentives to delete his link with the
non-unionized country. By Lemma 2, the star networks g
s
(i) and g
s
(j) are not pairwise
stable for
63a
275
< T ≤
a
4
because the spoke unionized country and the spoke non-unionized
country have incentives to form a bilateral free trade agreement. Thus, the complete
network g
c
is always pairwise stable for
63a
275
< T ≤
a
4
.
Moreover, the star networks g
s
(i) and g
s
(j) are not pairwise stable for T ≤ T
′
 0.089a,
because the unionized hub country has incentives to delete his link with the non-unionized
spoke country moving to the partial network g
p
(ij). Let T
′
 0.089a be the value of T for
which SW
∗
i
(g
p
(ij)) = SW
∗
i
(g
s
(i)). Since
SW
∗
k
(g
p
(ij)) =
463a
2
− 580aT + 400T
2
800b
<
9723a
2
− 6090aT + 25T
2
16800b
= SW
∗
k
(g
s
(i))
for all T <
1218a
1675
, and
SW
∗
i
(g
p
(ij)) =
59a
2
+ 30aT − 55T
2
160b
>
1239a
2
+ 504aT + 260T
2
3360b
= SW
∗
i
(g
s
(i)),
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for T ≤ T
′
 0.089a, then, g
s
(i) and g
s
(j) are not pairwise stable for T ≤ T
′
 0.089a.
Thus, g
p
(ij) is pairwise stable if and only if T ≤ T
′
because no unionized country has
incentive to delete the link between them.
Finally, the star networks g
s
(i) and g
s
(j) are pairwise stable if and only if T
′
< T ≤
63a
275
.
For such values of T both the unionized hub country and the non-unionized spoke country
have not incentives to delete the link between them. Moreover, the spoke unionized country
does not want to form a link with the spoke non-unionized country and does not want to
delete his link with the hub unionized country. That is,
SW
∗
i
(g
c
) =
59a
2
160b
<
1239a
2
+ 126aT − 475T
2
3360b
= SW
∗
i
(g
s
(j))
for all T <
126a
475
, and
SW
∗
i
(g
p
(jk)) =
3717a
2
− 1428aT + 2480T
2
10080b
<
1239a
2
+ 126aT − 475T
2
3360b
= SW
∗
i
(g
s
(j))
for all T <
1806a
3905
, i = j. Then, g
s
(i) and g
s
(j) are pairwise stable if and only if T
′
≤ T ≤
9a
41
.
Proof of Proposition 4.
By Lemma 1, the empty network g
e
and the star network g
s
are never pairwise stable
since two symmetric countries of the same type always want to form a bilateral free trade
agreement. Thus, the complete network g
c
is always pairwise stable, since no pair of
countries i and j have incentives to delete their link ij ∈ g
c
.
The partially connected network g
p
is never pairwise stable because the isolated country
and any of the two linked countries have incentives to sign a free trade agreement, i.e.,
SW
∗
i
(g
p
) < SW
∗
i
(g
s
) and SW
∗
j
(g
p
) < SW
∗
j
(g
s
) with ij /∈ g
p
, ij ∈ g
s
, and j /∈ N(g
p
).
Since
SW
∗
j
(g
p
) =
13041a
2
− 10584aT + 9040T
2
32256b
<
13041a
2
− 5292aT − 1724T
2
32256b
= SW
∗
j
(g
s
)
for all T <
147a
299
, and
SW
∗
i
(g
p
) =
13041a
2
− 6368T
2
32256b
<
13041a
2
+ 5292aT + 2020T
2
32256b
= SW
∗
i
(g
s
)
for all T > 0, g
p
is never pairwise stable.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Proof: We consider the four different settings.
[1.] All countries are non-unionized.
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Comparing the aggregate social welfare of the different networks we have
SW
∗
(g
c
) =
45a
2
32b
> SW
∗
(g
s
) =
45a
2
− 4aT − 2T
2
32b
SW
∗
(g
s
) =
45a
2
− 4aT − 2T
2
32b
> SW
∗
(g
p
) =
45a
2
− 8aT − 6T
2
32b
SW
∗
(g
p
) =
45a
2
− 8aT − 6T
2
32b
> SW
∗
(g
e
) =
3(3a− 2T )(5a+ 2T)
32b
for all T ≤
a
4
. Thus, SW
∗
(g
c
) > SW
∗
(g
s
) > SW
∗
(g
p
) > SW
∗
(g
e
) and aggregate social
welfare is increasing with the number of links.
[2.] Country k is unionized, countries i and j are non-unionized.
We should consider three cases.
Case 1. T <
3a
16
Comparing the aggregate social welfare of the different networks we have
SW
∗
(g
c
) =
527a
2
384b
> SW
∗
(g
s
(i)) =
4743a
2
− 420aT − 172T
2
3456b
SW
∗
(g
s
(i)) =
4743a
2
− 420aT − 172T
2
3456b
> SW
∗
(g
s
(k)) =
4743a
2
− 588aT − 268T
2
3456b
SW
∗
(g
s
(k)) =
4743a
2
− 588aT − 268T
2
3456b
> SW
∗
(g
p
(ij)) =
4743a
2
− 840aT − 472T
2
3456b
SW
∗
(g
p
(ij)) =
4743a
2
− 840aT − 472T
2
3456b
> SW
∗
(g
p
(ik)) =
527a
2
− 112aT − 72T
2
384b
SW
∗
(g
p
(ik)) =
527a
2
− 112aT − 72T
2
384b
> SW
∗
(g
e
) =
17(3a− 2T )(93a+ 34T )
3456b
Thus, SW
∗
(g
c
) > SW
∗
(g
s
(i)) = SW
∗
(g
s
(j)) > SW
∗
(g
s
(k)) > SW
∗
(g
p
(ij)) > SW
∗
(g
p
(ik))
= SW
∗
(g
p
(jk)) > SW
∗
(g
e
) and aggregate social welfare is increasing with the number of
links.
Case 2.
3a
16
< T <
3a
14
Comparing the aggregate social welfare of the different networks we have
SW
∗
(g
c
) =
527a
2
384b
> SW
∗
(g
s
(i)) =
3132a
2
− 196aT − 85T
2
2304b
SW
∗
(g
s
(i)) =
3132a
2
− 196aT − 85T
2
2304b
> SW
∗
(g
s
(k)) =
4743a
2
− 588aT − 268T
2
3456b
SW
∗
(g
s
(k)) =
4743a
2
− 588aT − 268T
2
3456b
> SW
∗
(g
p
(ij)) =
4743a
2
− 840aT − 472T
2
3456b
SW
∗
(g
p
(ij)) =
4743a
2
− 840aT − 472T
2
3456b
> SW
∗
(g
p
(ik)) =
527a
2
− 112aT − 72T
2
384b
SW
∗
(g
p
(ik)) =
527a
2
− 112aT − 72T
2
384b
> SW
∗
(g
e
) =
17(3a− 2T )(93a+ 34T )
3456b
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Thus, SW
∗
(g
c
) > SW
∗
(g
s
(i)) = SW
∗
(g
s
(j)) > SW
∗
(g
s
(k)) > SW
∗
(g
p
(ij)) > SW
∗
(g
p
(ik))
= SW
∗
(g
p
(jk)) > SW
∗
(g
e
) and aggregate social welfare is increasing with the number of
links.
Case 3.
3a
14
< T <
a
4
Comparing the aggregate social welfare of the different networks we have
SW
∗
(g
c
) =
527a
2
384b
> SW
∗
(g
s
(i)) =
3132a
2
− 196aT − 85T
2
2304b
SW
∗
(g
s
(i)) =
3132a
2
− 196aT − 85T
2
2304b
> SW
∗
(g
s
(k)) =
4743a
2
− 588aT − 268T
2
3456b
SW
∗
(g
s
(k)) =
4743a
2
− 588aT − 268T
2
3456b
> SW
∗
(g
p
(ij)) =
(33a − 14T )(47a+ 14T )
1152b
SW
∗
(g
p
(ij)) =
(33a− 14T )(47a+ 14T)
1152b
> SW
∗
(g
p
(ik)) =
527a
2
− 112aT − 72T
2
384b
SW
∗
(g
p
(ik)) =
527a
2
− 112aT − 72T
2
384b
> SW
∗
(g
e
) =
17(3a− 2T )(93a+ 34T )
3456b
Thus, SW
∗
(g
c
) > SW
∗
(g
s
(i)) = SW
∗
(g
s
(j)) > SW
∗
(g
s
(k)) > SW
∗
(g
p
(ij)) > SW
∗
(g
p
(ik))
= SW
∗
(g
p
(jk)) > SW
∗
(g
e
) and aggregate social welfare is increasing with the number of
links.
[3.] Countries i and j are unionized, country k is non-unionized.
We should consider three cases.
Case 1. T <
9a
41
Comparing the aggregate social welfare of the different networks we have
SW
∗
(g
c
) =
1083a
2
800b
> SW
∗
(g
s
(k)) =
3159a
2
− 252aT − 86T
2
2400b
SW
∗
(g
s
(k)) =
3159a
2
− 252aT − 86T
2
2400b
> SW
∗
(g
s
(i)) =
1053a
2
− 140aT − 50T
2
800b
SW
∗
(g
s
(i)) =
1053a
2
− 140aT − 50T
2
800b
> SW
∗
(g
p
(ik)) =
1053a
2
− 224aT − 102T
2
800b
SW
∗
(g
p
(ik)) =
1053a
2
− 224aT − 102T
2
800b
> SW
∗
(g
p
(ij)) =
1053a
2
− 280aT − 150T
2
800b
SW
∗
(g
p
(ij)) =
1053a
2
− 280aT − 150T
2
800b
> SW
∗
(g
e
) =
13(3a− 2T )(81a+ 26T )
2400b
Thus, SW
∗
(g
c
) > SW
∗
(g
s
(k)) > SW
∗
(g
s
(i)) = SW
∗
(g
s
(j)) > SW
∗
(g
p
(ik)) = SW
∗
(g
p
(jk))
> SW
∗
(g
p
(ij)) > SW
∗
(g
e
) and aggregate social welfare is increasing with the number of
links.
Case 2.
9a
41
< T <
63a
275
Comparing the aggregate social welfare of the different networks we have
SW
∗
(g
c
) =
1083a
2
800b
> SW
∗
(g
s
(i)) =
1053a
2
− 140aT − 50T
2
800b
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SW
∗
(g
s
(i)) =
1053a
2
− 140aT − 50T
2
800b
> SW
∗
(g
s
(k)) =
350719a
2
276768b
SW
∗
(g
s
(k)) =
350719a
2
276768b
> SW
∗
(g
p
(ik)) =
1053a
2
− 224aT − 102T
2
800b
SW
∗
(g
p
(ik)) =
1053a
2
− 224aT − 102T
2
800b
> SW
∗
(g
p
(ij)) =
1053a
2
− 280aT − 150T
2
800b
SW
∗
(g
p
(ij)) =
1053a
2
− 280aT − 150T
2
800b
> SW
∗
(g
e
) =
13(3a− 2T )(81a+ 26T )
2400b
Thus, SW
∗
(g
c
) > SW
∗
(g
s
(i)) = SW
∗
(g
s
(j)) > SW
∗
(g
s
(k)) > SW
∗
(g
p
(ik)) = SW
∗
(g
p
(jk))
> SW
∗
(g
p
(ij)) > SW
∗
(g
e
) and aggregate social welfare is increasing with the number of
links.
Case 3.
63a
275
< T <
a
4
Comparing the aggregate social welfare of the different networks we have
SW
∗
(g
c
) =
1083a
2
800b
> SW
∗
(g
s
(k)) =
350719a
2
276768b
SW
∗
(g
s
(k)) =
350719a
2
276768b
> SW
∗
(g
s
(i)) =
322650a
2
− 31682aT − 10835T
2
249696b
SW
∗
(g
s
(i)) =
322650a
2
− 31682aT − 10835T
2
249696b
> SW
∗
(g
p
(ik)) =
1053a
2
− 224aT − 102T
2
800b
SW
∗
(g
p
(ik)) =
1053a
2
− 224aT − 102T
2
800b
> SW
∗
(g
p
(ij)) =
1053a
2
− 280aT − 150T
2
800b
SW
∗
(g
p
(ij)) =
1053a
2
− 280aT − 150T
2
800b
> SW
∗
(g
e
) =
13(3a− 2T )(81a+ 26T )
2400b
Thus, SW
∗
(g
c
) > SW
∗
(g
s
(k)) > SW
∗
(g
s
(i)) = SW
∗
(g
s
(j)) > SW
∗
(g
p
(ik)) = SW
∗
(g
p
(jk))
> SW
∗
(g
p
(ij)) > SW
∗
(g
e
) and aggregate social welfare is increasing with the number of
links.
[4.] All countries are unionized.
Comparing the aggregate social welfare of the different networks we have
SW
∗
(g
c
) =
621a
2
512b
> SW
∗
(g
s
) =
1863a
2
− 252aT − 68T
2
1536b
SW
∗
(g
s
) =
1863a
2
− 252aT − 68T
2
1536b
> SW
∗
(g
p
) =
1863a
2
− 504aT − 176T
2
1536b
SW
∗
(g
p
) =
1863a
2
− 504aT − 176T
2
1536b
> SW
∗
(g
e
) =
9(3a− 2T )(23a+ 6T )
512b
for all T ≤
a
4
. Thus, SW
∗
(g
c
) > SW
∗
(g
s
) > SW
∗
(g
p
) > SW
∗
(g
e
) and aggregate social
welfare is increasing with the number of links.
Finally, Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 follow directly from the proofs of Proposition 1,
Proposition 2, Proposition 3 and Proposition 4.
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